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DRAFT

18 November 1968

There is a final para. or two missing, but this-- subject to your comments-- is about what I would send RJS.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT : Projections for the Military Planner

1. Regardless of what changes take place in the organization and planning processes of the Pentagon over the next several months (and there will be many), there will continue to be a need for intelligence projections of Soviet and Chinese Communist weapons systems and military capabilities ten years or more into the future. The need has grown out of several things--the long (and increasing) lead times from R&D to deployment of modern technological systems; the growing understanding of the interrelation of systems and forces and of the need to assess those interrelations in non-subjective, quantified terms; the great costs involved in weapons decisions. Only the Intelligence Community can define with authority what the threat is likely to be throughout the lifetime of a proposed weapon or force. On these judgments rest major decisions of what to develop and what to deploy and in what numbers and when.

2. The great drawback of the National Intelligence Estimates from the standpoint of the planners trying to operate under the procedures institutionalized by Secretary McNamara was that they trailed off into prose and narrative at that point where the planner most wanted help in quantifying his problem, that is, out beyond five years from the present. The NIPP has helped greatly with that problem.

3. Because the need for intelligence projections data is inherent in the problem of military decision-making in a technological society, I believe a new administration will want a document similar in content to the NIPP.

4. The fact that ONE chafes under the requirement to produce the NIPP is one measure of its utility. This responsibility has led those in ONE working on the military NIE's--and all of us who participate in the military estimative process--to be more mindful of the economic and other implications of long-range estimates on systems and forces. This is not a case of the tail wagging the dog. It is a matter of reality and discipline in how we attempt to describe the unknown. In short, I do not look on freeing ONE from the responsibility for preparing the NIPP as pure gain. There is much to be said for keeping it there.

Two Different Approaches

5. There are basically two different approaches that could be taken in moving the NIPP process out of ONE. One would involve minimum changes from the existing arrangements and would be characterized chiefly by transferring the action responsibility from D/ONE to D/OSR. The other approach would be more far-reaching and involve structural changes in the organization for preparing and issuing projections.

6. Transfer responsibility. The D/ONE is now, in effect, the executive agent of the Director of Central Intelligence for the preparation of the NIPP. Because of the relation between the military estimates on the Soviet Union and the NIPP, this was the only logical place for this activity in the first days of developing the projections. Since then, the Office of Strategic Research has been established. OSR chairs of the

ad hoc NIPP working groups and is the major contributor to the total NIPP process.

7. The Director of Central Intelligence could designate the Director of Strategic Research as his Executive Agent for the preparation, coordination, and issuance of national intelligence projections for military planning. Under such an arrangement, the

relationships that now exist in the Community to prepare material for use in the NIPP would continue essentially unchanged. The tasks formally accomplished in the ONE staff--assembling and drafting the sections--would be done in OSR. The product would continue to be prepared in conjunction and in consonance with the NIEs and would be noted by USIB.

8. This approach would decouple ONE and the NIPP to some degree. It would not eliminate the possible involvement of the USIB principals in disagreements that could arise in the process, especially as the Army, Navy, and Air Force would continue to be participants in the various ad hoc and other (e.g., JAEIC, GMAIC) supporting committees.

9. A CIA-Defense Council for Intelligence Projections?

A greater change that would affect not only ONE but also the involvement of the service intelligence agencies would come from the creation of a CIA-Defense Council for Intelligence Projection. This would be set up outside of the USIB subcommittee structure. It would be the joint instrument of the Director and the Secretary of Defense. Its mission would be to respond to the needs of OSD and the JCS for military intelligence projections. A five-man group would be established with a CIA chairman

(D/OSR), two CIA officers (1 OSR, 1 DDS&T), and two from DoD (1 OSD?, 1 DIA).

10. The council would work within the framework now provided by the military NIEs. Much of the contributing structure that now feeds the NIPP process would be drawn on. The council would draft its reports, circulate them for comment, and incorporate dissenting statements, but it would not issue its reports through USIB. Rather, they would stand as the statement of the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense in the area of intelligence projections for military planning, to be used in conjunction with the USIB-approved NIEs.

11. The council approach has the potential of a greater flexibility in meeting individual consumer's needs. It just might be possible to do something constructive with respect to the JIEP. If NATO moves deeper into the area of relative force comparisons, the council would be a natural locus for the work of the Intelligence Community on this subject.

12. The council, as described, would tend to minimize the influence of the service intelligence agencies. If it were established to supersede the present NIPP process, objections from those quarters probably would be heard.